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1 Introduction
Business Cycles and Firm Heterogeneity The business cycle,
which exerts a profound impact on many facets of the economy, has gen-
erally not been given much consideration in international trade models.
Traditional trade theories highlight the gains from trade that arise from
country level di¤erences, either broadly due to technology (Ricardian)
or endowment (Heckscher-Ohlin). Since these models describe the long
run general equilibrium gains from trade, the business cycle is in some
sense irrelevant. Perfect competition also renders the rm irrelevant in
equilibrium trade considerations. On the other hand, suppose one intro-
duces business cycle shocks to a newtrade model [Paul R. Krugman
(1979, 1980)] with homogenous rms. Since rms are homogeneous, the
business cycle a¤ects all rms symmetrically and does not therefore have
any reallocation e¤ects. Any business-cycle driven reallocation of market
shares can only be adequately described with a model of heterogeneous
rms.
This paper therefore asks the following question: how do business
cycle shocks a¤ect heterogeneous rms? What are the reallocative and
welfare implications? How do these shocks a¤ect the production and ex-
porting decisions of rms? These questions are interesting and important
on several counts.
To begin, trade in the context of rm heterogeneity has received much
theoretical research attention recently [Marc J. Melitz (2003); Andrew
B. Bernard, Stephen J. Redding and Peter K. Schott (2007) - henceforth
known as BRS; Melitz and Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano (2005)] motivated
by strong empirical evidence that points to the existence of persistent
productivity di¤erences between exporters and non-exporters. The key
contribution of the rm heterogeneity literature is to formally model the
reallocation of output and market shares between productively hetero-
geneous rms. Firms below the so-called productivity cuto¤ cease to
operate, ceding market shares to more productive rms above the cuto¤.
Economists are therefore able to formalise yet another source of wel-
fare gains through trade liberalisation, which arises by increasing the
productivity cuto¤s and the transfer of market shares to more produc-
tive rms. But since these models set out to formalise the long-run
equilibrium e¤ects of trade liberalisation, the business cycle is mostly
ignored. The notable exception is by Fabio Ghironi and Melitz (2004),
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which microfounds the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect through heterogeneous
rms and productivity shocks. However, the authors consider only the
exporting decisions of rms but not their production decisions.
With heterogeneous rms, it is also evident that business cycle shocks
will a¤ect di¤erent rms di¤erently, even in autarky. There are poten-
tially interesting reallocative e¤ects of output and market shares. The
macro consequence of the business cycle in an environment with hetero-
geneous rms is non-trivial since a rms continued production through
an adverse demand shock would depend on its productivity. The set of
rms that quit production in the face of adverse demand is therefore not
a random selection, and there exists a systematic relationship between
productivity cuto¤s and business cycle shocks1.
Trade between economies with asymmetric shocks would therefore
present another point of interest: how would heterogeneous rms behave
and what would be the macroeconomic welfare consequences? The ob-
jective of this paper is to model the e¤ect of business cycles and trade in
an analytically tractable manner.
Model Outline The starting point of the paper is the introduction
of productivity shocks into a Melitz type model. By altering the size
of the market, these business cycle productivity shocks then translate
into demand shocks for rms. This paper does not consider any nominal
rigidities that a¤ect rmsability to adjust. However, rms have to invest
in xed assets rst (due to production lags) before production takes place.
The e¤ect of this is that rms face an uncertain demand since they are
investing before the shocks are realised2. Due to the heterogeneity in
1On the other hand, business cycle shocks with homogeneous monopolistically
competitive rms do not yield much meaningful analysis. For example, suppose a
Krugman type rm has to decide on market entry by making a xed asset investment
without knowing the level of demand entry under uncertainty will occur until ex-
ante prot becomes zero for all rms. If demand turns out to be high, there will be
insu¢ cient entry and all rms will make a prot. Conversely, there will be too many
entry rms if demand is low and all rms will be unable to recover xed costs and
thereby make losses. Depending on the realisation of the aggregate demand shock,
either all rms make prots or all rms make losses since rms are homogenous. The
equilibrium does not provide any richness in describing the reallocation e¤ect that
would occur with heterogeneous rms.
2In Ghironi and Melitz (2004), the aggregate shock in that model is introduced
via rmsuncertainty over their future productivity. As there are no xed production
cost, production decisions are not a¤ected by shocks - only exporting decisions are
a¤ected. The departure in this paper is the presence of xed production cost, which
then a¤ects a rms decision whether to continue through adverse shocks.
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production costs, prot outcomes are no longer symmetric. For example,
with a negative aggregate shock, weaker rms will make losses while
stronger ones will still make prots. With a positive shock, all rms
will make prots but again prots will be higher for more productive
rms. Though aggregate prots shift up or down depending on the ex-
post demand shocks, there is always a prot ranking where a more
productive rm always has a higher prot.
Furthermore, in a general equilibrium, productivity shocks also change
the available aggregate resources in the market place. As Melitz (2003)
notes,  . . all the e¤ects of trade on the distribution of rms are
channelled through a second mechanism operating through the domestic
factor market where rms compete for a common resource. The rst
mechanism - namely product market competition - is not operative . .
. due to CES preferences: the price elasticity of demand for any vari-
ety does not respond to changes in the number or prices of competing
varieties.3
A similar mechanism of factor competition is at work in this paper.
When faced with a negative aggregate shock, the aggregate savings (of
consumers) fall. Since aggregate savings equal the gross investments into
rmsxed costs, fewer rms are able to invest and continue production.
The upshot of this is that weaker rms will have to quit the market,
tting the stylised fact that recessions have a greater impact on weaker
rms. In this paper however, an additional mechanism is introduced via
demand uncertainty: Firms have to invest in xed asset before demand
is realised. The expected market size (in the next period) will change a
rms decision whether to continue in the market.
Trade and Capital Market Integration Away from autarky,
two processes of integration occur. The rst is capital market integra-
tion that allows capital to be shipped between countries. The second is
goods market integration that allows consumption goods to be shipped.
As this paper is focused on the e¤ects of goods trade only, capital market
integration is assumed to be as simple as possible. There is a perfectly
3Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) provide a model with quasi-linear preferences with
rm heterogeneity that delivers reallocation of market shares through competition
in the goods market. However in that model, any changes to income a¤ect only the
consumption of the competitive sector and have no impact on the monopolistic sector.
The model is therefore less suitable in the context of modelling demand shocks to the
monopolistic sector.
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competitive international market for capital to be shipped between coun-
tries and returns to capital costlessly remitted back to capital owners for
consumption. This is the key assumption of the Footloose Capitalclass
of models in Economic Geography. While this may not necessarily be
a robust or realistic assumption, it nevertheless allows the paper to ab-
stract from any capital market complications that might arise and focus
on the goods market instead.
It turns out that in equilibrium, even the perfect mobility of capital
cannot replicate the outcome of free goods trade4. Why might this be so?
The presence of trade costs alter the perceived expected market size faced
by monopolistically competitive rms. In the presence of trade costs, the
productivity cuto¤s of two countries cannot be equalised in some circum-
stances, leading to di¤erent selection e¤ects in both countries. The fact
that two economies have di¤erent productivity cuto¤s is not trivial. First,
it implies that capital is not optimally invested as some less e¢ cient rms
(in the country with lower productivity cuto¤) can continue production
when they otherwise cannot with free trade. Secondly, it implies that
the reallocative e¤ect is not maximised since some weaker rms continue
producing behind trade barriers. In the presence of trade costs, market
shares are therefore not allocated in the most e¢ cient manner across
economies.
What then are the benets of free trade? As rms in each coun-
try operate in a larger fully integrated market, the productivity cuto¤s
in both countries are completely equalised (but may still change with
di¤erent demand states). This represents the optimum deployment of
capital and allocation of market shares between heterogeneous rms and
across economies. More signicantly, this leads to a diversication ef-
fect which in equilibrium reduces price-output uctuations faced by each
economy in autarky. This result stems from the fact that only free trade
equalises the productivity cuto¤s between countries, and allows for an
equally productive set of producers to operate. The increased macro-
economic stability presents yet another source of welfare gains for the
risk-averse consumer.
Limitations In this paper, business cycle shocks are introduced
by way of a two-state (good or bad) Markov process. While this is
4This is a di¤erent result from Robert Mundell (1957) that shows that free trade
in factors is equivalent to free trade in goods in a neoclassical setting.
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more limiting compared to where productivity shocks (innovations) are
normally distributed with mean zero [see Ghironi and Melitz (2004)]5, the
Markov process allows the paper to solve various variables in a stationary
equilibrium. When analysing the e¤ects of international trade, this paper
considers only a two-country setting to highlight the diversication e¤ect
clearly. Nevertheless, the insights can be extended to a multi-country
setup. Finally, to derive analytical solutions explicitly, the paper assumes
the productivity distributions to be Pareto [Ghironi and Melitz (2004);
BRS (2007)].
2 The Model Setup
2.1 Endowments
There are L identical consumers (who are also workers) in the economy.
The consumers have innite lives, and each is endowed with some mean
level of human capital denoted by H, thereby providing a mean level of
e¤ective labour force of LH.
2.2 States of the World
There are two possible states of the world, bad and good, denoted by
subscript S = B or G. There is high HG in the good state and low HB in
the bad state. This is the characterisation of the aggregate shock. The
transition from period to period is given by a simple Markov process
Pr(HG;t+1 j HG;t) = Pr(HB;t+1 j HB;t) = 
where 1 >  > 1
2
reects the persistence of the shocks. To abstract from
growth dynamics, the model assumes the shocks to be symmetric around
the mean level
HG = (1 + )H HB = (1  )H
5For example, it will not be possible to generate variable moments to t the data,
greatly reducing the testable implications on parameters.
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where  < 1 is the size of the shock. Naturally, the average size of
this economy over many periods will be LH6. Workers sell their labour
services to the market inelastically.
2.3 Preferences
In each period t, the j consumers utility is given by
ujt = x
1 
0 x

1 where x1 =
Z

t
c
 1

it di
 
 1
and  > 1. Good x0 is the homogenous good, produced competitively
with unit labour, costlessly traded, and used as the numeraire (P0 = 1).
Good x1 is the di¤erentiated good, where 
t is the set of varieties avail-
able to the consumers at discrete period t. Furthermore, each consumers
discounted lifetime utility is given by
Uj =
1P
t=0
t lnujt
where  < 1 is the subjective discount factor in each period.
This preference specication thus exhibits the double-diminishing
property. There is diminishing marginal utility to the consumption of
each variety in any time period and also diminishing marginal utility to
the number of varieties in each period. The log utility also implies that
the consumers are strictly risk-averse, preferring a stable level of utility
(or varieties) over time. This will be the key property that gives rise
to welfare gains when countries trade since aggregate price (or output)
stability is welfare enhancing.
2.4 Technology and Firms
The homogeneous good is competitively produced. Even after the open-
ing of economies to trade, this paper assumes that the homogeneous
good will be produced everywhere (incomplete specialisation), thereby
pinning down the price of homogeneous good and wages everywhere to
w = P0 = 1 [see Elhanan Helpman, Melitz and Stephen R. Yeaple (2004)].
For the di¤erentiated industry, there is an exogenous massM of exist-
6There is no long-run growth, and the model abstracts from growth e¤ects consid-
ered in Richard E. Baldwin and Frederic Robert-Nicoud (2006).
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ing rms with heterogeneous productivity characterised with a produc-
tivity distribution that has a cumulative distribution G(') and density
function g(')7. Each atomistic rm has a constant productivity ' specic
to itself on this distribution8.
In every period, each rm has a per period xed cost f . The key
requirement is that f has to be in place one period before production
takes place due to production lags. If a rm does not invest in f during
this period, it will not be able to produce in the period after that. After
the xed cost is incurred, a rm can begin production in the next period
with the production function given as
l =
q
'
where l is the labour requirement to produce q units of output.
2.5 Capital Goods
Consumers save by investing in a perfectly competitive mutual fund,
which then supplies f to the rms in return for next periods operat-
ing prots as dividends to the fund. The fund then channels the div-
idends back to the consumers. This approach is seen in Ghironi and
Melitz (2004) and it greatly simplies the saving-investment process of
consumers. With heterogeneous rms, each existing rm will have a dif-
ferent rm value. Considering the investment into a mutual fund this way
allows one to ignore the investment choices of individual consumers. This
simplication means that the consumers e¤ectively own the entire port-
folio of heterogeneous rms through the mutual fund (in equal shares),
and receive the same stream of dividend. In this way, one can also char-
acterise the economy with a representative consumer who owns all the
rms in the economy.
7In the Melitz (2003) model, steady state rm mass is pinned down by the size
of the market. There is constant steady state entry to replace the exogenous steady
state exit (subject to paying sunk cost fe and drawing a productivity level above
the cut-o¤). This paper has elected to keep the number of rms xed to simplify
the exposition. This can be motivated by the fact the economy has a long-run size
of LH, despite period to period  shocks. To be explicit, the paper is making the
assumption that the  shocks are small enough relative to a large sunk cost fe such
that no rms will nd it protable ex-ante to enter on the basis of business cycle
shocks alone. Coupled with the assumption of no exogenous destruction, the number
of rms becomes xed.
8The minimum support of the pareto distribution is given as ', while the shape is
given by parameter k.
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As countries move away from autarky, this paper makes a departure
from Ghironi and Melitz (2004), which assumes that consumers in each
country invest in a mutual fund that owns only the portfolio of domestic
rms. Here, the paper allows a countrys savings to be invested into
the xed cost of rms in another country, and the operating prots to be
costlessly remitted back to owners for consumption. This is in a sense the
assumption of perfect capital mobility widely used in Footloose Capital
models in New Economic Geography.
3 Equilibrium in Autarky
As the paper deals with a Markov type uncertainty with only two states,
the equilibrium is in fact stationary - the economy switches between good
or bad state equilibrium instantly once the shocks are realised, and there
are no further transitional dynamics.
3.1 Consumers Problem
Since all consumers are identical, one can deal with the model with a
representative consumer (normalising L to 1). The consumer faces a
decision on how much to spend (and save) in each period given the state
of the world and how much to spend on each good. In each period,
the consumer simply solves the following Bellman equation with value
function 
t(!t; Ht) = max lnut + t+1(!t+1; Ht+1jSt)
subject to the inter-temporal budget constraint
E

!t+1
t
jSt

= Ht + !t   Et
The representative consumer holds the entire market portfolio of shares
of all rms. The rst source of income is wage income Ht. The second is
the net revenue of rms !t returned to the consumer as a dividend. His
expenditure is Et and he saves by again investing in the market portfolio
of rms with an expected return !t+1, suitably discounted by interest
rate t.
The optimisation of the Bellman equation with the log utility and
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Markov process give the following Euler equations
1
EG
= G


1
EG
+ (1  ) 1
EB

1
EB
= B


1
EB
+ (1  ) 1
EG

(1)
where EG and EB are the expenditures of the good and bad states, G
and B are the real interest rates. From equation (1), as expenditure is
higher in the good state EG > EB, the real interest rate is also higher in
the bad state B > G (the real interest rates will be solved explicitly in
later sections). This is a standard result - a higher real interest rate is
necessary in the bad state for the consumer to be indi¤erent between cur-
rent and future consumption. Since there are only two levels of aggregate
expenditure, of which a constant  is spent on the di¤erentiated sector,
there are also only two levels of aggregate revenue in the di¤erentiated
sector given by
RG = EG RB = EB
Indirect Utility The indirect utility of the consumer in each period
can be written as
V =
(1  )1 ES(t)
PS(t)
 (2)
where S denotes the state. The consumers indirect utility depends on
two factors - his current state-contingent expenditure ES(t) and the ag-
gregate price level PS(t) of the di¤erentiated sector9. However, since the
number of rms that are producing in period t is determined in period
t 1 given the production lag, the CES aggregate price level PS(t) in fact
depends on the investment decisions in the previous period. For exam-
ple, if today is a good state while the previous state is bad, the indirect
utility is in fact given as V GB =
(1 )1 EG
PB
, where PG < PB. Though
todays income is high, welfare is lower due to the higher CES aggregate
price. V GG therefore gives the highest indirect utility and V
B
B the lowest.
3.2 Prot Conditions
The productivity cuto¤ is dened as a productivity level ' that allows
a rm to break even in expectation with the investment into xed cost.
9The price of the homogenous good is normalised to 1, and therefore does not
appear in the indirect utility equation.
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A rm with this cuto¤ productivity level is labelled as the marginal rm.
Any rm with a productivity level below this cuto¤ will not invest in
xed assets and not produce in the next period [see Melitz (2003); BRS
(2007)].
Proposition 1 There exists a Prot Conditionfor the good state PCG
that provides the relationship between the expected protability of a rm
and its productivity ', when the economy is hit with a positive shock.
Proof. In equilibrium, the marginal rm with productivity ' will have
expected revenue re(') that recovers investment cost with interest in
expectation only. This can be written as
re(') =
p('G)
1 
P 1 G
[RG + (1  )RB] = Gf (3)
where p('G)
1  = 
 1
1
'G
is the CES optimal price, and [RG + (1  )RB]
is the expected aggregate market size in the next period given the Markov
process. Because of the CES function, the ratio of (expected) rev-
enues between two rms with productivity ' and ' is given as r
e(')
re(') =
'
'
 1
. This allows the expected revenue of any rm with productivity
' to be expressed as re(') =

'
'
 1
re('). The expected prot be-
comes (') = 1


'
'
 1
Gf   Gf . This is simplied to be a function
of the productivity cuto¤ only
G(') =
"
'
'
 1
  1
#
Gf (4)
Proposition 2 There exists a bad state Prot Condition PCB that pro-
vides the relationship between the expected protability of a rm and its
productivity ', when the economy is hit with a negative shock.
Proof. From the previous proposition, the marginal rm condition be-
comes
re(') =
p('B)
1 
P 1 B
[RB + (1  )RG] = Bf (5)
The expected prot, characterised by PCB, can be written as the function
of the marginal rm with productivity ' only. As the real interest rate
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is now B, PCB can be written as
B(') =
"
'
'
 1
  1
#
Bf (6)
Since B > G, the cost of capital is higher in the bad state, shifting
the prot function downwards. The real interest rates will be solved
explicitly in later subsections.
3.3 The Impact of Uncertainty and Shocks
Before the paper proceeds to provide the analytical solution to the equi-
librium, it is useful to highlight several key facts of this equilibrium. Four
realisations of ex-post prots can occur even though there are only two
levels of average productivity (since there are only two cuto¤s 'G and
'B), because rms have to make investment decisions before the shocks
are realised. Actual protability is therefore not only a function of pro-
ductivity but is also a¤ected by ex-post demand. Measuring productivity
using ex-post realisations of prot can therefore be misleading. Because
of the lag structure, high prots can be due to a positive demand shock
without any change in the underlying productivity of rms.
Secondly, rm level aggregates are now a¤ected by the relevant state.
In the good state, rms with productivity levels higher than 'G will invest
f to produce in the next period. With a negative shock, the cuto¤ level
increases to 'B as market conditions go from easy to tough. The result is
that rms between G('B) and G('

G) will have negative expected prots
if they choose to stay in the market.
Since the parameters are constant, the model in fact has stationary
equilibrium properties. The equilibrium shifts to the good state or the
bad state without any further dynamics. This allows the relationship
between the numbers of rms to be written as
MB =

1 G('B)
1 G('G)

MG (7)
When a bad state comes after a good one, a proportion of rms
h
1 G('B)
1 G('G)
i
will not invest in f and quit the market. The business cycle therefore
introduces a selection e¤ect where only a stronger and smaller subset of
rms is productive enough to continue investing through the bad state.
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The nal point to make here is that rms below 'G will never invest
since they can never recover the xed cost.
3.4 Aggregate Resource Constraints
The aggregate resource constraint for the good state can be written as
H(1 + ) +
EG

= EG +MGf (8)
The terms on the left hand side are total wage income H(1 + ) where
 is the size of the aggregate shock, and dividend EG

which is the op-
erating prots of rms producing in the current period (they invested f
previously)10. The left hand side thus represents total income ow to the
representative worker. The corresponding expression for the bad state
can be written as
H(1  ) + EB

= EB +MBf (9)
This paper has done away with the Melitz exit mechanism by assum-
ing a xed number of rms M on the distribution G(') [see Thomas
Chaney (2006)]. This allows one to write MG and MB explicitly as a
function of M and the respective cuto¤s only
MG = [1 G('G)]M MB = [1 G('B)]M (10)
This is consistent with equation (7) provided earlier.
Consider the good state aggregate constraint in equation (8). It can
be re-written as
H(1 + ) + EG

  


=MGf
By writing the equation this way, the left hand side of the equation is
simply the aggregate savings (net of expenditure). By making use of
10See Appendix A:2.8.1 for the distribution of revenues and prots across rms.
The proofs show that aggregate operating prots (which ow back to consumers as
dividend) are functions of aggregate expenditures only, independent of the number of
rms. In other words, the distribution of market shares across rms does not a¤ect
the aggregate resource constraints.
13
equation (10), the mass of rms investing in the good state becomes
[1 G('G)]M =
H(1 + ) + EG
 
 


f
(11)
Similarly, the mass of rms investing in the bad state becomes
[1 G('B)]M =
H(1  ) + EB
 
 


f
(12)
In short, the mass of rms that can carry on investing is a function of
the net available resource saved in the economy in each period divided by
the per rm capital requirement. These two equations therefore allow the
productivity cuto¤s to be pinned down once the aggregate expenditure
(and hence savings) in each state is known. Since aggregate savings are
smaller in a bad state, the productivity cuto¤ 'B must be higher.
3.5 Equilibrium Characterisation
The equilibrium is a set of variables {'G, '

B, EG, EB, G, B} that satisfy
the pair of Euler equations in (1), resource constraints (11) and (12), and
the marginal rm conditions (3) and (5).
Making use of the two Euler equations in (1), the ratio of expenditures
can be written as
EB
EG
=
G
B
"
 1
EG
+ (1  ) 1
EB
 1
EB
+ (1  ) 1
EG
#
Let EG
EB
= , where  > 1 is the ratio of good to bad state expenditure (
will be solved later). The above equation can be written as
1

=
G
B

+ (1  )
 + (1  )

This gives the ratio of interest rates as
B
G
=

+ (1  )
 + (1  )

 (13)
which is greater than one.
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Dividing equation (5) by (3) gives the following relationship
p('B)
1 
P 1 B
p('G)1 
P 1 G

RB + (1  )RG
RG + (1  )RB

=
B
G
This relationship can be simplied in two steps. Firstly, the denition of
aggregate prices - which is a function of rm mass and average produc-
tivity - can be substituted into the above equation. Secondly, one can
make use of the convenient relationship that arise from the pareto distri-
bution - that the ratio of average to cuto¤ productivity is a constant11.
This constant is therefore cancelled out on the left hand side of the above
equation. Together, these simplify the relationship to
MG
MB

+ (1  )
 + (1  )

=
B
G
By substituting the ratio of interest rates from equation (13), the ratio
of rm mass can be solved as
MG
MB
=  (14)
Dividing equation (11) by (12) gives
MG
MB
=
H(1 + ) + EB
 
 


H(1  ) + EB
 
 


With the left hand side to be exactly  from equation (14), one can
simplify the above relationship and solve for
 =
1 + 
1   (15)
as a function of shock parameter  only. Therefore, the ratio of expendi-
tures EG
EB
and ratio of rm mass MG
MB
are exactly the ratio of productivity
shocks .
From the bad state Euler equation
1
EB
= B


1
EB
+ (1  ) 1
EG

11With the pareto distribution,

~'
'
 1
=
h
k
k+1 
i
.
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Multiplying across by EG gives  = B [ + (1  )]. This allows the
real interest rate to be solved as a function of parameters only
B =

 [ + (1  )] (16)
Similarly, the good state interest rate can solved as
G =
1
 [+ (1  )] (17)
With the solution to the interest rates, one can solve for EG and
EB by plugging B and G into the marginal rm equations in equations
(5) and (3), and then making use of the rm constraint conditions in
equations (9) and (8). These will provide four equations to solve for the
remaining endogenous variables EG, EB, MG, and MB. Nevertheless,
because of the complexity of the equations, this method is algebraically
cumbersome.
There is a quicker way to solve for the variables. Suppose that  = 0
(no shocks). In equilibrium, there will only be one interest rate since
B = G =
1

, there will only be one level of expenditure E = EG =
EB, and one constant rm mass M = MG = MB. The marginal rm
condition from equations (5) and (3) collapse to one single equation
1
M
 E =
1

f
where  =

'
~'
 1
=

k+1 
k

simply reects the nice property of the
pareto distribution where the ratio of average to cuto¤ productivity is
a constant. Without aggregate shocks, there is also only one aggregate
constraint
Mf = H + E

  


By making the substitution of Mf into the previous relationship, one
can solve for
E =
H
   +  (18)
This is the solution to the expenditure level in the absence of shocks
( = 0).
Since any shocks are symmetric around the mean level of H, and
that EG
EB
=  = 1+
1  in equilibrium, the exact level of expenditures in the
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presence of shocks are simply solved as
EG =
H(1 + )
   +  EB =
H(1  )
   +  (19)
Note that the levels of expenditures depend on parameters only. Firm
level variables such as productivity average or cuto¤ productivities, or
aggregate variables such as interest rates, have no bearing at all on the
level of expenditures. Fluctuation in expenditures is purely a result of
 with no other inuences. With the solutions to the level of aggregate
expenditure, one can easily solve for the mass of rms using the aggregate
constraints in equations (9) and (8)
MG =
H(1 + )
f

 
   + 

MB =
H(1  )
f

 
   + 

(20)
Aggregate Prices and Welfare Implication The expression of ag-
gregate price is
P =M
1
1 
S


   1
1
~'S

where MS is the number of producing rms with state S = G or B, and
~'S is the average productivity dened as
~'S =
"
1
1 G('S)
Z 1
'S
' 1g(')d'
# 1
 1
With the pareto distribution, the average productivity becomes a func-
tion of the cuto¤ only
~'S =

k
k + 1  
 1
 1
'S
where k is the parameter that characterises the shape of the distribution.
Using the denition of the aggregate prices, the ratio of bad to good
CES prices is given as
PB
PG
=

MG
MB
 1
 1 'G
'B
(21)
Following a bad state (due to the lag structure), there are fewer rms
and the e¤ect of this is to increase the CES aggregate price. This e¤ect is
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seen in the term

MG
MB
 1
 1
which is greater than 1. However, the average
productivity following a bad state rises since only a smaller subset of rms
above 'B survive. With rm heterogeneity, there are fewer rms but they
are of higher productivity, thereby resulting in an opposite e¤ect on the
aggregate price level. This is seen by the ratio '

G
'B
which is less than 1.
Another way of seeing this is to realise that rm heterogeneity softens
the e¤ect of underlying shocks because the rms that stop investing f in
a bad state are the least productive ones.
Despite the opposing e¤ects, there is no ambiguity on the price level
with the pareto distribution. Using the fact that MG =

'
'G
k
M and
MB =

'
'B
k
M from equation (10) given the pareto distribution, the
productivity cuto¤s are explicitly solved as
'G = '

M
MG
 1
k
'B = '

M
MB
 1
k
(22)
Substituting these into equation (21), the aggregate price ratio can be
solved as
PB
PG
= 
k+1 
k( 1) (23)
which is strictly greater than 1 (in other words PB > PG). Aggregate
CES prices are always counter-cyclical. A good state leads to lower prices
while a bad state leads to higher prices, amplifying the e¤ect of the
business cycle shocks. The larger the  shock, the larger the uctuation
in aggregate prices and welfare.
Diagrammatic Representation Diagrammatically, the equilibrium
can be illustrated in Figure 112. The prot conditions here are forward
looking. Once a rm has invested xed cost f in the last period, it will
denitely produce in the current period because of the CES demands;
it does not care about cuto¤s. However, the rm has to decide whether
to quit or to continue investing f . The Y-axis therefore represents not
realised average prots rms earn but expected prots. The X-axis rep-
resents the cuto¤ level of productivity below which rms will choose not
to invest in f and quit the market.
12Note that by putting ' in the X-axis raised to the power of   1, the prot con-
ditions become straight lines. The level of capital costs becomes the Y-axis intercepts
[see Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004)].
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Therefore, while there is an exogenous mass ofM heterogeneous rms
along the entire distribution of G('), the number of rms that stay in
the market is endogenous. Not all are su¢ ciently productive to stay in
the market given the cost of capital. Since aggregate savings are higher
in the good state, there will be a larger mass of rms that will invest in
f as compared to the bad state MG > MB. The larger the  shock, the
greater is the rm mass ratio , which results in a larger aggregate price
uctuation.
Figure 1: Prot Conditions In Autarky
PCG
PCB
A Simple Numerical Example This subsection provides a simple
numerical example to the equilibrium just characterised. The parameters
used here are not meant to be realistic as the purpose of this exercise is
simply to demonstrate the equilibrium e¤ects in the presence of shocks.
The productivity distribution G(') is assumed to be pareto with support
at 0.1 and shape of k = 4. The rest of the parameters are provided in
Table 1.
The equilibrium at two levels of  shocks are given in Table 2.
Table 2 illustrates a clear point. The larger the aggregate shock ,
the larger the di¤erences between good and bad state variables. There is
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Table 1: Parameters for Firms and Business Cycles
Parameter H     M f
Value 1000 4 0:5 0:75 0:9 100 1
Table 2: Equilibrium of Business Cycles
 'G '

B G B MG MB EG EB PG PB
0:05 0:1322 0:1355 1:083 1:138 32:76 29:64 1162:6 1051:8 1:986 2:003
0:10 0:1305 0:1372 1:053 1:164 34:51 28:23 1217:7 996:3 1:977 2:011
greater uctuation of the price level between PB and PG. Note that the
aggregate prices are counter cyclical - a good state leads to lower prices
while a bad state leads to higher prices. Given the per period indirect
utility in equation (2), the counter-cyclical price uctuations therefore
amplify the e¤ect of expenditures EG and EB, resulting in welfare loss
for the risk-averse consumer.
4 Opening to Trade
Despite rm heterogeneity softening the impact of fewer rms investing
in a bad state, there continues to be uctuation in the aggregate prices
caused by business cycle shocks. The important welfare question is: can
trade integration between two economies reduce the uctuation?
In answering this question, a few simplifying assumptions should be
made. Firstly, the consumersexpenditures in both economies continue
to be uncorrelated after opening to trade. There is no insurance or risk-
sharing between consumers of both economies13. The implied assump-
tion here is that the international capital market exists for rms only,
it does not facilitate borrowing or lending for consumption smoothing.
This assumption greatly simplies the characterisation of the trade equi-
librium since it ignores the potential interactions between consumers of
two di¤erent countries. For the rms, the e¤ect of this assumption is
that aggregate demands are uncorrelated across countries. This is not
a wholly realistic assumption, but is nevertheless well supported empir-
ically. Indeed, the lack of correlation between consumption of countries
13This could be due to incentives issues such as moral hazard, or costly monitoring
and high transaction costs. Because of these reasons, income insurance between coun-
tries is not widely observed. Therefore, the trading of international bonds is ruled
out.
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is just one of the six major puzzles of international macroeconomics [see
Maurice Obstfeld and Kennedy Rogo¤ (2000)].
Secondly, there is a perfectly competitive international capital market
that allows savings in one economy to be invested towards xed cost f
in another, and net revenue costless remitted back to capital owners for
consumption. Consumers (savers) in one economy can invest into and
become owners of rms in the other economy in return for next periods
prots.
Thirdly, the paper considers only two-country trade for the ease of
exposition and to bring out the analytical results more clearly. Never-
theless, as the reader shall see, the insights can be easily extended to
multi-country trade.
5 Two Country Model
Two economies are identical in every way - labour size L, average produc-
tivity H, preferences, production technology and productivity distribu-
tion. They also have the same mass of rmsM on the same productivity
distribution G('). However, both have independent aggregate shocks
even after they are open to trade.
Proposition 3 With free trade, both economies will always have a com-
mon productivity cuto¤.
Proof. The proof can be made by contradiction. With free trade, every
rm has complete market access into both markets wherever they are lo-
cated. With free trade, the levels of competitive intensity (characterised
by the trade weighted CES price aggregates) are also the same in both
locations. Therefore, a rm has to be indi¤erent between the two loca-
tions. Suppose one location (labelled as Home) has a productivity cuto¤
of 'H while the other (labelled as Foreign) has a cuto¤ of '

F such that
'H 6= 'F , a rm that lies between 'H and 'F is above one cuto¤ (prof-
itable) and below the other cuto¤ (unprotable). There exists a mass
of rms between 'H and '

F that will not be indi¤erent since they can
invest f in one of the market with positive expected prots. This vio-
lates the denition of productivity cuto¤s (this proposition will be given
a further formal proof later).
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5.1 Open Economy with Trade Costs
5.1.1 Iceberg Trade Cost
Variable trade costs are introduced as the standard iceberg trading cost
of  > 1 for every unit of good shipped across the economies. With only
variable trade cost, the price of export is simply a mark-up over the price
of domestic sales pX = p.
Proposition 4 In the presence of iceberg trade costs, the productivity
cuto¤s between countries cannot be equalised when they are faced with
asymmetric shocks.
Proof. The paper rst sketch a intuitive proof, with the formal proof
provided later in the next sub-section. Suppose Home and Foreign economies
have asymmetric shocks (Home in a bad state and Foreign in a good state
with no loss of generality) and that cuto¤s are equalised 'H = '

F . If
cuto¤s are equalised, the mass of rms investing f is the same in both
locations given the assumption of a xed number (or density) of rms
along the same productivity distribution. If the cuto¤s are the same at
both locations, the aggregate price indices will be equal at both loca-
tions whatever the level of trade costs. Since Home is in a bad state, the
expected aggregate expenditure, taking into account both domestic and
export revenue subjected to trade cost, is
fRB + (1  )RG + [RG + (1  )RB]g
This is strictly smaller than the expected aggregate expenditure of the
Foreign economy
f[RB + (1  )RG] + RG + (1  )RBg
since it is in a good state and  < 1 because of trade costs. If 'H denes
the rm having zero expected prot if it invests f at Home, a rm with
this productivity must have positive expected prots in Foreign given the
larger expected market size there. This violates the denition of 'F as
the productivity cuto¤.
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5.1.2 Equilibrium Characterisation With Iceberg Cost
This subsection proceeds to characterise the productivity cuto¤s in the
presence of iceberg trade cost. The impact of xed export costs fX will
be briey discussed in Appendix A.
Symmetric Shocks
Proposition 5 The productivity cuto¤, common to both economies, is
'G when they are in the good state; and is '

B when both economies are
in the bad state.
Proof. Consider the case when both economies are in the bad state.
Whatever the level of  , both economies have the expected aggregate
revenues since they are hit with symmetric shocks. Furthermore, both
economies will have low aggregate savings, with the same aggregate re-
source constraint in equation (12). Hence, there is no capital ow between
the economies. This pins down a common productivity cuto¤ 'B. The
same reasoning applies when both economies are in the good state.
Asymmetric Shocks The only case where iceberg cost results in dif-
ferent cuto¤s is when Home and Foreign are hit with asymmetric shocks.
In this case, aggregate savings in both economies are di¤erent and there
is the possibility of capital ows a¤ecting the productivity cuto¤s in each
economy.
Without a loss of generality, suppose Home economy has the bad
state while Foreign has the good state, and that trade cost is positive
 > 1. Given EH = EB and EF = EG14, the trade equilibrium is a set of
variables {'H , '

F , M} that satisfy the following conditions, where M is
the cost of capital faced by the rms in the Home and Foreign economy
respectively.
First, the marginal rms with productivities 'H and '

F must have
zero prots in their respective locations. This gives the pair of equations
p('H)
1 
P 1 H
[RB + (1  )RG] + p('

H)
1 
P 1 F
[RG + (1  )RB] = Mf
14Note that from equation (19), since there is no insurance across consumers in the
di¤erent countries, their levels of expenditures are a¤ected by their domestic shocks
only.
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p('F )
1 
P 1 H
[RB + (1  )RG] + p('

F )
1 
P 1 F
[RG + (1  )RB] = Mf
where p('H) =

 1
1
'H
and p('F ) =

 1
1
'F
are the optimal prices charged
by the marginal rms, PH and PF are the trade weighted CES price
aggregates. By substituting the expressions for the CES price aggregates
and cancelling out some terms, the above equations become simplied to
' 1H [RB + (1  )RG]
MH ~'
 1
H + MF ~'
 1
F
+
' 1H [RG + (1  )RB]
MH ~'
 1
H +MF ~'
 1
F
= Mf (24)
' 1F [RB + (1  )RG]
MH ~'
 1
H +MF ~'
 1
F
+
' 1F [RG + (1  )RB]
MH ~'
 1
H + MF ~'
 1
F
= Mf (25)
Secondly, given the global pool of savings which is the resource con-
straint, the total number of rms is given as
[1 G('H)]M+[1 G('F )]M =
H(1 + ) + EG
 
 


f
+
H(1  ) + EB
 
 


f
(26)
Together, these provide three conditions to solve for {'H , '

F , M} given
EG and EB. Note that it must be the case that 'H > 'F in equilibrium
since there is a smaller set of producers for the Home country (which is
in a bad state)15.
5.1.3 The Diversication E¤ect with Free Trade
Given the characterisation of the equilibrium with costly trade (positive
iceberg costs), it is easy to show the equilibrium e¤ects under free trade.
With equations (24) and (25), one arrives at the following equality
' 1H [RB + (1  )RG]
MH ~'
 1
H + MF ~'
 1
F
+
' 1H [RG + (1  )RB]
MH ~'
 1
H +MF ~'
 1
F
=
' 1F [RB + (1  )RG]
MH ~'
 1
H +MF ~'
 1
F
+
' 1F [RG + (1  )RB]
MH ~'
 1
H + MF ~'
 1
F
15Note that even though trade cost is positive, the two economies continue to have a
common cost of capital M because capital is completely mobile. That is, the last unit
of capital f invested must recover the same expected amount Mf in both economies
even though they have asymmetric shocks. Therefore, H = F = M in equilibrium
even in the presence of positive trade cost. The fact that productivity cuto¤s are not
equalised is due to trade cost altering the degree of capital ows between the two
economies when they have asymmetric shocks.
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Figure 2: Prot Conditions with Free Trade
PCG
PCB
PCM
With free trade ( = 1), the aggregate prices - given by the denomina-
tors - are equal. The expected revenues in brackets also become equal.
Together, these imply that 'H = '

F even in the presence of asymmetric
shocks. A Home rm will be a perfect substitute for the foreign rm. In
other words, free trade will result in a common cuto¤'M even with asym-
metric shocks to both economies. This is the formal proof to Proposition
3. The e¤ects of free trade can be seen in Figure 2.
This result can also be inferred from the rm mass equations in (20).
These give the rm masses in equilibrium with the good and bad state,
which is a function of  shocks and other parameters only. In a fully
integrated economy with free trade, it simply means that the  shocks
cancel out. With free trade, the rm mass that is common to both
economies becomes
MFTM =
H
f

 
   + 

(27)
Since there is a common rm mass, there is a common cuto¤ 'M [anal-
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ogous to the relationships specied in equation (10)]16.
From equation (23), the ratio of aggregate prices is a function of pro-
ductivity cuto¤s only. Denoting free trade variables with superscript FT ,
the price ratios become P
FT
B
PFTG
= 
k+1 
k( 1) , where P FTB denotes the aggregate
price when both economies are faced with a negative shock (analogous
denition for P FTG )
17. With asymmetric shocks, the productivity cut-
o¤ becomes 'M for both economies (where '

B > '

M > '

G) given free
trade. As the  shocks are cancelled out, the aggregate price level with
asymmetric shocks P FTM therefore lies between P
FT
B and P
FT
G .
There are now two sources of gains from trade. Firstly there is an ex-
pansion of varieties leading to lower aggregate prices and higher welfare.
Secondly, there is a reduction in the probability that extreme price levels
are reached. This reduces the variance in the aggregate price level and
the uctuation in real income, thereby representing a welfare gain from
diversication for the risk-averse consumer. This is a gain from trade
above and beyond the expansion of variety e¤ect.
Free trade therefore results in the optimal allocation of market shares
for there will always be an equally productive subset of rms producing in
each economy and selling across markets. The result is that productivity
cuto¤s are completely equalised even as countries face asymmetric shocks.
When economies are hit with asymmetric shocks, there is essentially
a diversication equilibrium. For example, suppose the Home economy
is in a bad state. Under autarky, the cuto¤ productivity would have
been 'B. However, if the trading partner Foreign is in a good state,
Homes cuto¤ productivity falls to 'M with free trade. In other words,
some rms that would have quit a domestic negative shock at Home in
autarky will now continue to produce, as expected prots from exporting
more than compensate for the expected domestic loss. Aggregate rm-
level productivity therefore does not always increase with trade.
Finally, there is a subtle implication from the price ratio P
FT
B
PFTG
=

k+1 
k( 1) . The parameter k characterises the level of rm heterogeneity.
16In the presence of trade cost, the rm mass is always larger in the country with
the positive shock since the expected market size is bigger. The economy with the
negative shock will have a smaller rm mass and higher price aggregate. Without
free trade, aggregate prices are not equalised with asymmetric shocks. Given that
consumers are risk-averse, this is welfare-reducing.
17Note that since both economies are in the same state, the cuto¤s are unchanged
from the autarky counterparts, which are 'B for the bad state and '

G for the good
state.
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A smaller k implies that rms are more heterogenous while a larger k
implies that rms are more homogenous. A decrease in k would lead to
an increase in k+1 
k( 1) , propagating the aggregate price uctuations. In
other words, if rms are more heterogeneous, the net e¤ect (after ac-
counting for rm entry and changes in aggregate productivity) is greater
price uctuation. This suggests that the diversication gains from trade
are higher when rms are more heterogeneous.
5.2 Why Iceberg Trade Cost Matters: Comparison
with Melitz Model
In the Melitz model with the absence of xed export cost, the passage
from autarky to free trade (by  falling from innity to 1) increases
welfare through the CES price aggregates, with no further impact on
rm level variables. The reason for this is that a fall in  increases local
competitive intensity through the price index but also increases export
revenue, leaving the rm exactly indi¤erent.
However, the level  is crucial here and a¤ects the productivity cut-
o¤s. The key here is to realise that Melitz presents a model which is
a long run stable equilibrium of countries of symmetric sizes, Firms
correctly anticipate this stable aggregate environment when making all
relevant decisions. The analysis then focuses on the long run e¤ects of
trade and the relative behaviour and performance of rms with di¤er-
ent productivity levels.In that model, both consumption demand and
investment into rms are constant. The presence of iceberg cost there-
fore does not have any further e¤ect since it preserves the homotheticity
amongst all rms.
In this paper, even though both economies have a long run aver-
age size of LH, each of them uctuates around two states dened by
the Markov process. The pool of aggregate savings in each economy
changes according to the shocks, thereby changing the resource available
for investment, and in the process altering the survivability conditions in
di¤erent states.
5.2.1 Cross Border Capital Flow
Given that aggregate savings are not the same when the countries are
faced with assymetric shocks, there will be cross border capital ow.
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Through its e¤ects on expected market potentials,  changes the incen-
tive for cross-border capital ows. A lower  provides higher incentive
for the high savings economy (good state) to invest into the low sav-
ings economy (bad state), until the productivity cuto¤s are completely
equalised with free trade. Conversely, a higher trade cost  creates a
divergence between the perceived market sizes when the economies are
hit with asymmetric shocks and reduces the diversication e¤ect. Trade
liberalisation therefore dampens di¤erences in productivity cuto¤s be-
tween two economies when they are hit with asymmetric shocks, leading
to lower price-output uctuations.
The key point is this: free capital mobility, in the presence of pos-
itive trade costs, cannot equalise the productivity cuto¤s between two
economies when they are hit with asymmetric shocks. Therefore, free
capital mobility alone cannot replicate free trade outcomes. Since pro-
ductivity cuto¤s are unequal with asymmetric shocks and positive trade
costs, market shares are not allocated in the most e¢ cient way between
heterogeneous rms across the two economies. Only with free trade will
there be optimal allocation of market shares between productively het-
erogeneous rms across countries - that is, an equally productive subset
of producers in each country (above a common productivity cuto¤ of 'M
when there is asymmetric shocks) will stay in the market.
5.3 Extension to Output and Multiple Countries
In the setup of the model, the paper has modelled welfare changes to the
consumer through the impact of trade on the CES price aggregates. How-
ever, there is an simple conceptual extension to output. If one considers
the di¤erentiated sector as an immediate sector supplying a nal com-
petitive sector as in the Ethier production function [see also Anthony
J. Venables (1996)], the smaller price uctuation shown here directly
translates into smaller output uctuation of the nal sector. Free trade
therefore reduces output uctuation in this interpretation. So long as
the consumer is risk-averse, the lower uctuation of price-output will be
a source of welfare gain.
Furthermore, if a large number of countries with uncorrelated  shocks
are engaged in free trade, all of them will converge to 'M , completely
stabilising aggregate price-output across all economies. Except to note
that this result is obvious from the Central Limit Theorem, this will not
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be given any formal proof.
6 Conclusion
This paper has built on recent trade and rm heterogeneity literature,
in particular the aggregation properties of Melitz (2003) in the presence
of rm heterogeneity. Real Business Cycles type aggregate productivity
shocks, with consumers who optimise inter-temporally, are introduced
into a setting where rms have to invest in xed assets before the realisa-
tion of the shocks. This model therefore makes the rms problem more
realistic compared to traditional trade models.
Without rm heterogeneity, a negative shock would result in all rms
making losses, thereby rendering any between-rms analysis meaningless.
As it is now possible to solve for market and rm level outcomes in the
presence of rm heterogeneity, it has become meaningful to analyse the
reallocative impact of such shocks. Di¤erent rms will be a¤ected di¤er-
ently while still allowing for market aggregates to be solved analytically.
When trade is not totally free, the productivity cuto¤s cannot be
equalised, and some producers are shielded by trade barriers and will
continue to have positive market shares. With free trade, productivity
cuto¤s are always equalised in both economies in a full diversication
outcome - which means that an equally productive subset of producers
remain in the market. Nevertheless, the diversication equilibrium also
implies that aggregate rm-level productivity does not always increase
with trade. Weak companies that would have quit in a negative demand
shock in autarky can continue to operate given diversication possibili-
ties.
Despite this, the model o¤ers a comforting result for trade economists
by identifying another source of trade gains. The key to unlocking the
insight from the model lies in understanding that opening to trade results
in smaller uctuation in the aggregate price levels and may therefore raise
the welfare of risk-averse consumers.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Distribution of Aggregate Revenues and Prots
This subsection highlights the distribution of aggregate revenues and
prots across rms. It will show that aggregate revenues are independent
of the number of existing rms. The stream of dividend to the consumers,
which depends on aggregate revenues only, is therefore also una¤ected by
the number of rms. This shows that the good and bad state resource
constraints in equations (8) and (9) are also independent of rm level
considerations.
The consumer is forward looking. Once the current state is realised,
his adjustment to EG or EB is instant, pinning down the current periods
market size or aggregate revenue for the industry (RG or RB). However,
the revenue per rm depends on the number who invested f in the pre-
vious period, which depends on the last periods realised state. There
could either be MG or MB rms investing f previously, who will share
revenue this period
RG=MB RG;B=MG RG;G
where RG;B denotes the average per rm revenue conditioned on a pre-
viously bad state (analogous for RG;G). Since MG > MB, the per rm
revenue is higher when there are fewer competitors RG;B > RG;G. Simi-
larly for the bad state
RB=MB RB;B=MG RB;G
where RB;B > RB;G. Therefore, conditioning out the current state, av-
erage revenue is always higher when the previous state is bad. Since the
ratio of average productivity is directly related to the ratio of average
productivity (to the power of    1), this shows that average productiv-
ity of rms is higher following a bad state.
RG;B
RG;G
> 1)

~'B
~'G
 1
> 1(
RB;B
RB;G
> 1 (A1)
This result shows that 'B > '

G. Conditioned on the current state,
average prot is therefore also higher if the previous state is bad.
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Per rm prot is higher following a bad state To develop this
idea more formally, one can show that
RG;B =
Z 1
'B
p(')1 EG
P 1 B
MBg(')d' =
Z 1
'G
p(')1 EG
P 1 G
MGg(')d' = RG;G
It does not matter what the previous state is, aggregate revenue RG
depends on only the current state. Furthermore, operating prot will
also be RG

if today is a good state. Similarly
RB;B =
Z 1
'B
p(')1 EB
P 1 B
MBg(')d' =
Z 1
'G
p(')1 EB
P 1 G
MGg(')d' = RB;G
This establishes the following inequalities
RG;B =
RG;B
MB
>
RG;G
MG
= RG;G RB;B =
RB;B
MB
>
RB;G
MG
= RB;G (A2)
Since the consumers optimise instantly, RG and RB are pinned down im-
mediately. However, the number of rms selling in this period has the lag
e¤ect of investing f the previous period. Aggregate revenue is therefore
shared among the mass of rms determined in the previous period, and
the market shares allocated as such. However, aggregate revenues are
una¤ected by the number of rms since RG;B = RG;G (good state) and
RB;B = RB;G (bad state). The stream of dividend for consumers in each
state is therefore also una¤ected by the number of rms.
7.2 EquilibriumCharacterisation with Fixed Export
Cost
The rm heterogeneity literature is motivated by the empirical evidence
that only a small and productive subset of rms engage in exporting
activities. The presence of iceberg trade cost alone does not create this
export partitioning, due to the CES preferences. In order to achieve
export partitioning, a xed export cost fX has to be introduced. This
paper assumes that fX has exactly the same conditions attached to f -
it is funded through aggregate savings and has to be invested one period
before export can take place.
For exporters to be a small and more productive subset of all rms,
there must exist rms with productivity below ' that nd it protable to
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operate domestically (with domestic revenue rD) but not export (thereby
foregoing revenue rX). The two inequalities therefore become
rD(')

  f > 0 rD(')

+
rX(')

  f   fX < 0
where rX(') =  1 rD(') due to the CES preference. Together, the
partitioning condition implies that
f <  1 fX
which says that the combination of iceberg cost and xed export cost
must be high enough to deter some rms from exporting. Dene 'X as
the marginal rm that just breaks even through exporting. The proba-
bility that a rm is strong enough to export is the conditional probability
of a rm having a distribution above 'X . This conditional probability
~pX is given as
~pHX =
1 G('HX)
1 G('H)
Note that rD('H) = Hf and rX('

HX) = rD('

HX) = HfX .
Taking ratios of the two gives the following relationship


'HX
'H
 1
=
fX
f
or 'HX =
1


fX
f
 1
 1
'H
which says that the export cuto¤'HX is a function of domestic cuto¤'

H
only. This allows the conditional export probability ~pX to be determined
as a function of parameters only.
Suppose Home and Foreign are in a good state. The aggregate re-
source constraint from equation (26) becomes modied as
[1 G('G)]M =
H(1 + ) + EG
 
 


f + ~pHXfX
(A3)
In other words, global aggregate savings have to be used to fund xed
cost f as well as the the fX requirements of exporters. By inspecting
equation (A3) and comparing it with equation (26), it is clear that the
e¤ect of xed export cost will shift 'G rightwards (higher). The ef-
fect of fX creates another source of resource competition. As exporters
demand fX , there will be fewer rms in equilibrium and productivity
cuto¤s will have to increase. Similar analytical reasoning can be applied
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to when both economies are in a bad state or when they have asymmet-
ric shocks. The e¤ect of xed export cost will always push productivity
cuto¤s higher.
Assuming that export partitioning holds, the conditional probability
of exporting ~pHX is strictly less than 1. The e¤ects of trade liberalisation
(as characterised by a fall in ) can be seen from the above equation. As
 falls, the conditional probability of exporting increases. This increases
the denominator of equation (A3), leading to an increase in the produc-
tivity cuto¤s 'G through the competition of resource.
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